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Abstract—Smart grids are increasingly proliferating all over
the world to leverage electricity infrastructures with infor-
mation technology. Smart metering, particularly Advanced
Metering Infrastructure (AMI), is an enabling technology for
realizing smart grids by collecting and processing energy
consumption logs and managing energy for customers and
utility companies. Security is one of the main concerns of smart
metering, and potential threats and attacks to this technology
have been discussed since the early initiatives. Considering
the unbounded and changing nature of security problems,
especially in complex and critical cyber-physical systems, smart
metering security concerns can not be always addressed at
design time. Autonomic self-protection promises to address
runtime security concerns in proactive and reactive ways. In
this paper, we focus on the customer domain of smart metering,
and investigate potential reactive self-protection scenarios by
concentrating on requirements. To this aim, we analyze a
sample set of published security requirements from the AMI-
SEC forum [1] to derive self-protection requirements. Then
we discuss how these requirements can be linked to the MAPE
loop [2] in the autonomic computing architecture.
Keywords-Self-protecting; Smart metering; Security require-
ments; Autonomic computing; Smart grid;
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart gird technology aims at leveraging the power grid
with information technology to improve efficiency, flexibility
and reliability of managing energy resources and power-
enabled devices. Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)
is a way to realize the smart grid. AMI offers a rich struc-
ture for collecting and processing metering information for
customers and utility companies. However, AMI flexibility
and its rich set of features could introduce vulnerabilities to
power grid and energy management. In the last five years
numerous articles have been published on AMI and smart
grid security, and how new changes in the power gird could
be threatful.
Generally, security cannot be guaranteed, and its bounded
view at design-time would not probably protect all the
valuable assets in the boundary of systems in all situations.
Security requirements may fail, cannot be satisfied anymore,
or domain assumptions may not be valid anymore. In these
cases the system may need changes in security counter-
measures and even requirements. Autonomic computing
proposed self-protection as one of the major properties of
autonomicity to address these runtime security concerns [2].
However, existing smart grid and metering infrastructures
and technologies have not considered emerging security
problems at runtime and self-protection. Our main motiva-
tion is to investigate self-protection in smart metering and
explore this area as a new domain for software adaptation.
This motivation leads us to define the problem of self-
protection in smart metering from the Requirements En-
gineering perspective. Requirements engineering for auto-
nomic and self-adaptive software systems is not well es-
tablished and is still challenging, as discussed by Cheng
et al. [3], and Salehie and Tahvildari [4]. This paper does
not aim to propose a process for requirements engineering
of self-protecting systems. Instead, we intend to explore
runtime self-protection needs in smart metering and to
investigate possible requirements.
Requirements in this problem domain, which we call them
self-protection requirements (SPR), should be elicited from
stakeholders and/or derived from the security requirements
of managed elements in smart metering systems. However,
requirements and architecture specifications are intertwined,
as discussed by Nuseibeh [5]. Therefore, we should consider
the target architecture in elaborating and refining SPRs. In
this paper, we adopt the autonomic computing reference
architecture [6] including the MAPE loop.
Identifying SPRs for the entire AMI needs an extensive
analysis of security requirements in customer, generator and
distributer domains. For this paper, we narrow the scope of
SPRs to the customer domain of smart metering. This allows
us to investigate potential self-protection scenarios without
dealing with the complexity of the entire metering infras-
tructure. Our contributions in this paper are: i) analyzing
security requirements published by AMI-SEC [1] to investi-
gate whether self-protection in smart metering is essential, ii)
defining a sample set of self-protection requirements based
on AMI-SEC document, and iii) linking these self-protection
requirements to the MAPE loop in the autonomic reference
architecture.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
gives a brief review of smart metering and self-protecting
state of the art. Section 3 provides a short review of
smart metering and its significant entities, especially in
the customer domain. Section 4 analyzes security issues
in smart metering. Section 5 discusses how self-protection
requirements can specify the autonomic system behavior,
and Section 6 derives a sample set of such requirements in
smart metering by considering the MAPE loop. Section 7
draws conclusions and points out potential future directions
for this work.
II. RELATED WORK
Up to our knowledge, there is no work on self-protecting
smart metering. First, we briefly reviews the self-protecting
systems in practice, and how they define self-protection.
Then, we look at the state of the art in requirements
engineering for autonomic and adaptive software. Although,
there is no research effort specifically on self-protection
requirements, reported experiences are quite useful for this
paper.
A. Self-protecting systems
Self-protecting solutions are often referred to artificial
immune, intrusion detection and similar systems in the liter-
ature (e.g., see [7] [8] [9]). The IBM autonomic computing
architectural blueprint defined self-protecting as [6]: “To
anticipate, detect, identify, and protect against threats.” What
stakeholders expect from such a self-protecting system has
been defined by these four capabilities, although the last one
is general. It is not clear that after identifying threats what
will happen, and the definition does not refine the “protect”
capability.
The vision of autonomic computing elaborates further this
definition [2]: “Autonomic systems will be self-protecting
in two senses. They will defend the system as a whole
against large-scale, correlated problems arising from mali-
cious attacks or cascading failures that remain uncorrected
by self-healing measures. They will also anticipate problems
based on early reports from sensors and take steps to
avoid or mitigate them.” In this definition, problems seem
refer to threats, and a self-protecting system is supposed to
anticipate them similar to the first definition. But attacks
are specifically addressed and an interesting point is that
unintentional failures are also considered as potential threats
if they propagate through the system. Chess et al. [10] fo-
cused on security aspects of autonomic computing, from an
architectural point of view. They discuss that the autonomic
manager should monitor and control the managed element,
and control the access to its input and output channels.
Requirements were not explicitly discussed in this work, but
Chess et al. highlighted two general properties of detection
and restoration.
Debar et al. [11] defined the goal of intrusion detection
systems in the MAFTIA project as “to discover breaches
of security, attempted breaches, or open vulnerabilities that
could lead to potential breaches”. They mentioned the
possibility of applying countermeasures after detection as
well. Several efficiency properties such as performance, fault
tolerance, accuracy and completeness were also mentioned
for these systems.
Julisch from IBM Zurich research lab [12] used root
cause analysis to identify why an intrusion detection system
raises alarm. The ultimate goal of that work was to reduce
the number of alarms to be notified to users. Atighetchi
et al. [13] from BBN technologies targeted intrusion tol-
erance through strategies such as replicating key application
components, attack containment and unpredictable change
of configurations.
In another related work, Joel Weise, from the adaptive
security architecture project in Sun Microsystems, listed sev-
eral goals for adaptive security, including reduce remediation
time, reduce threat amplification, decrease attack velocity
and shrink the attack surface [14]. Automatic repairing
of discovered vulnerabilities is also addressed by some
industrial research. For example, ShieldGen [15] is a tool
provided by Microsoft research to generate patches in order
to prevent zero-day attacks.
None of these work clearly and explicitly defined the
problem of self-protecting by requirements specifications.
But they explained features and capabilities expected from
a self-protecting system. These capabilities can be mapped to
the monitoring, analyzing, planning and executing functions
in the MAPE loop. The aforementioned capabilities particu-
larly related to analyzing and planning. Detecting, diagnosis,
and anticipating (prognosis) are linked to analyzing, and
tolerating, repairing, recovering and similar capabilities are
related to planning.
B. Autonomic and adaptation requirements
Two high-level aspects of requirements need to be dis-
cussed in engineering autonomic and adaptive software, and
in this context self-protecting software: i) functional and
non-functional adaptation requirements, and ii) the role of
requirements at runtime. The former should be linked to the
adopted architecture, which in this paper is the autonomic
architecture, and most often includes a control loop. But
for requirements at runtime, three roles are discussed in the
RE community: i) monitoring requirements, ii) evaluating
requirements as targets for adaptation, and iii) evolving
requirements.
Fickas and Feather [16] highlighted the importance of
requirements monitoring at runtime for evolution. They
posed two questions to figure out how we can know when
a system needs to be evolved, and how we can use the
acquired knowledge to orchestrate the evolution. Souza et
al. [17] noted that “adaptation takes place when require-
ments are found to be partially/un-fulfilled.” They introduced
awareness requirements as a way to deal with adaptation
requirements and their fulfillments at runtime, which mostly
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Figure 1. A general schema of smart metering system by focusing on the customer domain.
address monitoring and analyzing functions in the MAPE
loop. Awareness requirements refer to success, failure, per-
formance and other properties of software requirements.
Mylopoulos defined adaptivity requirements as [18] “aware-
ness requirements that can also talk about changes of status
for another requirement.” In this view operationalization
of adaptation requirements is reactive rather than proactive
(proactive behavior in this view is addressed by requirements
at the development time).
Baresi et al. [19] proposed FLAGS (Fuzzy Live Adaptive
Goals for Self-adaptive systems) based on fuzzy goals to
deal with fulfilment of requirements at runtime. Adaptation
goals define countermeasures for dissatisfaction of system
goals. These countermeasures are responsible for changes in
the goal model to prevent violation of a goal, enforce a par-
ticular goal, or move to substitute one. Salehie and Tahvil-
dari [20] proposed GAAM (Goal-Attribute-Action Model)
as a runtime model for representing system and adaptation
goals. Autonomic manager uses GAAM to monitor goals
and select appropriate actions in each situation.
The existing research body partially addresses what we
need to deal with autonomic requirements. Representing and
managing these requirements need to provide new processes,
languages, verification methods, and traceability from re-
quirements to architecture and source code. Particularly,
defining and managing self-protection requirements have
not been investigated. Compared to other self-* properties,
uncertainty level is higher, and monitoring self-protection
requirements is more difficult.
III. SMART METERING IN AMI
Figure 1 depicts the high level structure of a smart
metering system, by concentrating on the customer domain.
In this domain, meter records energy consumption data
and other logs of the system (including any changes in
the configuration). Management console provides the user
interface and management services to configure and moni-
tor the system behavior. Electrical/electronic equipment is
power consumer including regular appliances and critical
equipment for safety and security (e.g., anti-theft system).
Equipment can be smart appliances that have local energy
management units. Home Area Network (HAN) is the inter-
nal data network between meter, management console and
equipment. HAN gateway is the interface between HAN and
the external world. There may be also some local power
generation sources in the customer domain, such as solar
panels. Customers and maintenance crews can access HAN
remotely to monitor or control devices in the customer
domain.
Major benefits of AMI include [21]: two-way communica-
tion between consumers and providers, easier consumption
management, better system resilience, and easier metering
data management and billing. Generally, smart grid is an
evolving domain and some experts believe that existing
AMI solutions still do not address smart grid objectives.
For example, Turner and Taft1 argued that AMI focuses on
customer premises, while smart grid includes many other
assets and data in generation, transmission and distribution.
In the context of this paper, only the customer domain is
discussed and AMI addresses this domain adequately for
our objectives.
Security concerns of the smart grid have been discussed
since the very beginning, and security often has been men-
tioned as the top issue to be taken into account in realizing
smart metering. Smart grid is believed to be much vulnerable
1D. Turner, J. Taft, “Smart Grids and AMI: Understanding the Big
Picture”, www.energypulse.net, September 2008
3
than existing power grids, mainly due to an extended attack
surface [22], which is associated to augmenting information
technology to the power grid. Therefore, security in AMI is
extremely significant for stakeholders, and AMI-SEC task
force provided security requirements to elaborate what are
expected from a smart grid employing AMI [1]. Several
other organizations have also provided detailed guidelines
for smart grid security, e.g., NIST published a three-volume
guideline for security and privacy concerns and require-
ments [23]. In this paper we consider the AMI-SEC set
of security requirements, which roughly organized based on
security goals.
IV. ANALYZING SECURITY IN THE CUSTOMER DOMAIN
OF SMART METERING
In this section, we analyze security requirements and
architecture artifacts published by AMI-SEC. We briefly
review valuable assets, threats, security requirements and
vulnerabilities, and give our view of these artifacts.
A. Valuable assets and corresponding security threats
In the customer domain of smart metering system, consid-
ering Figure 1, three categories of assets are recognizable:
• Energy is the main critical asset in the customer domain
that needs to be protected.
• Information in the metering system, including metering
audit trail, billing data, pricing data, and personal
information.
• Equipment and applications for metering and energy
management in the customer premise also need to be
protected, including the meter, management console,
networking devices, and the applications running on
equipment.
• Electrical and electronic appliances can be the critical
assets that need to be protected. Equipment may be
security controls that protect other valuable assets.
For example a digital access control mechanism that
controls valuable devices, documents or VIPs. In this
case, energy disconnection or interruption could harm
the protected assets.
Notable threat agents for the entire AMI system can
be [24]: customer, insider, outsider, and prior insider. How-
ever, human errors, equipment failures and natural disasters
may also lead to security threats as well [25]. In a typical
customer domain, threat agents would be customer (e.g.,
house or organization owner), outsiders (e.g., a neighbor),
or prior insider (e.g., previous tenants). Because AMI em-
ploys information technology and the metering is accessible
remotely from the network (and often from web), most of
the common threats in Internet would be likely. However,
energy and its related assets may motivate a host of other
threats for financial gain, fraud and sabotage [21].
Almost all of the existing self-protecting systems have
targeted cyber security and mainly information security.
However, security in smart metering is about cyber-physical
assets, and this is what makes self-protection different from
other practices. Especially energy as an asset brings new
challenges to security and self-protection, since threatening
this asset could harm other assets in the system. Considering
asset types, the following threats in a customer domain are
notable:
• Threats regarding energy as the primary asset: The
most significant attack in this category is energy theft,
by a customer or an external agent (e.g., a neighbor).
This attack can be realized by methods such as meter
tampering, meter bypassing, and log modification. Also
power shut down (i.e., denial of service) is under this
category.
• Threats regarding energy as the secondary asset: In this
category two cases may happen. First, power-enabled
security controls may be targeted. For example, access
control systems, surveillance cameras, and network se-
curity devices. The power outage or interferences would
knock off these functions and would ease access to pro-
tected assets. Second, depending on facilities the smart
metering system provides, power-enabled appliances
might be manipulated in a way to be harmful to people
or assets in a property. For example, safety incidents
(fire or electrocution) may happen by manipulating
electrical appliances (i.e., usurpation threats).
• Threats regarding energy-related information assets:
There may be other assets not in the above categories
prone to security attacks. For instance, audit trail may
be modified to conceal the energy theft, but this asset
could be also misused in other ways. Such assets
could be misused towards confidentiality and privacy
breaches (e.g., revealing location and types of used
devices), vandalism, fake utility retail, and harm to
reputation (e.g., manipulating the metering data to
frame someone).
For the scenarios in this paper, we focus on threats to
energy assets and related information.
B. AMI-SEC security requirements
AMI-SEC published the AMI system security require-
ments covering three categories [24]: primary services (ad-
dressing major goals such as availability), secondary services
(including cryptographic and resource management services)
and assurance (including accountability and access control).
We base the scenarios and self-protection requirements on
the primary services section of this document.
Table I shows several security requirements from AMI-
SEC document [1]. Authorization requirements are denoted
by AZR, availability requirements by AVR, and accountabil-
ity requirements by ACR.
AZR1 limits the number of concurrent users, perhaps to
ease access control and to avoid flooding attacks. However,
assume a situation when the system cannot afford even the
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Table I
A SAMPLE SET OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FROM AMI-SEC DOCUMENT [1]
Category Security requirement
Authorization AZR1: The security function shall limit the number of concurrent sessions for any user to [assignment: organization-defined number
of sessions] on the system.
Authorization AZR2: The security function shall enforce the most restrictive set of rights, privileges or accesses needed by users or workstations
(or processes acting on behalf of users) for the performance of specified tasks.
Availability AVR1: The security function shall ensure that each access to all shareable resources shall be mediated on the basis of the subjects
assigned priority.
Accountability ACR1: The organization shall allocate sufficient audit record storage capacity and configure auditing to reduce the likelihood of
exceeding storage capacity.
Accountability ACR2: The security function shall [actions to be taken in case of possible audit storage failure] if the audit trail exceeds [pre-defined
limit].
required number of sessions for some users. This could be
the case of a denial of service attack by a customer in
order to reject accessing to the metering log from the utility
company. AZR2 limits the access to the system services due
to performance concerns of some specified tasks, and AVR1
guarantees access to the system resources based on the user
priority. These two requirements can adjust access to data
and energy management services, but they can also impact
on each other as we explain later in Section VI. ACR1 and
ACR2 refer to the audit record storage capacity and when
it is about to be filled. The audit trail is a valuable record
in the metering system, because it includes the consumption
log and changes in the security controls. An energy theft
attack most likely clears its footprint in this record.
C. Implicit self-protection capabilities in AMI
The AMI-SEC document [1] implicitly or partially noted
some self-protection capabilities in smart metering. For
example, the document includes a set of eight requirements
for anomaly detection services, and among these the
following requirement is related to the context of this paper:
“The organization shall implement control system
incident handling capabilities for security incidents that
includes preparation, detection and analysis, containment,
eradication, and recovery.”
This is a general self-protection requirement, and
the AMI security requirements analysts admitted that
unexpected incidents should be detected and responded.
But this requirement needs to be elaborated and refined
further, particularly regarding the target architecture. There
are also some other security requirements scattered in
other categories that implicitly address adaptation and
self-protection. For example, under accounting category
there is the following requirement:
“The security function shall take [assignment: list of
actions] upon detection of a potential security violation.”
These actions are related to recovering, repairing, pre-
venting and tolerating security violations, which can be run-
time actions for self-protection. Among these self-protection
capabilities, detection has been addressed more than the
others. For example Berthier et al. [26] focused on intrusion
detection, and interestingly their approach is specification-
based to identify deviation from desired behaviors (close
to runtime requirements monitoring). They argued that al-
though specification-based intrusion detection in AMI is able
to find unknown attacks, it is more expensive and provide
little information for diagnosis. Robinson and Stuber [24]
also noted that system controls are required for detective, de-
terrent, preventive and corrective behaviors in AMI without
elaborating them further. Berthier et al. [26] also mentioned
three main classes of requirements– including prevention,
detection and mitigation/resilience– for secure AMI without
discussing them as runtime self-protection capabilities.
V. DERIVING AND DECOMPOSING SELF-PROTECTION
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MAPE LOOP
Self-protection requirements can be directly elicited by the
stakeholders and/or can be derived from managed element
artifacts, such as SLAs and particularly security require-
ments. In the former case, customers and utility company
owners/administrators express what they expect from self-
protection, for instance to deal with failures of security
requirements. In the latter, security requirements of managed
elements are analyzed to derive self-protection requirements.
In this view self-protection requirements refer to other re-
quirements, in a sense of meta-requirements. This is similar
to what Souza et al.[17] defined as awareness requirements
for general software adaptation, although those requirements
consider only monitoring. In this paper, we focus on deriving
self-protection requirements from already published security
artifacts.
We denote self-protection requirements by SPR, which
can be defined based on failures, conflicts and other condi-
tions for the security requirements in metering system:
• Failures and frequent failures of security requirements
• Relationships and conflicts between security require-
ments
5
 Monitoring
Analyzing Planning
Executing
Sensors Effectors
Monitor
Detect 
Diagnose 
Tolerate 
Prevent 
RecoverPrognose
Repair
Relax
Evolve
Risk Assessment
Planning 
Requirements (PR)
Execution 
Requirements (ER)
Analysis 
Requirements (AR)
Monitor 
Requirements (MR)
Figure 2. Decomposing self-protection requirements (SPR) for the MAPE loop
• Relationships and conflicts between security and other
quality requirements (e.g., performance and usability)
• Failures and frequent failures of self-protection require-
ments
As noted before, due to the links between requirements
and architecture specifications, we cannot elaborate self-
protection requirements without considering the target ar-
chitecture. By adopting the autonomic reference architec-
ture [6], SPRs are decomposed to four categories of require-
ments corresponding to the MAPE loop, as illustrated in
Figure 2.
First, MRs (Monitor Requirements) need to be defined
to specify what can be and should be monitored, includ-
ing security requirements and probably other SPRs. Sec-
ond, ARs (Analysis Requirements) are defined to determine
when adaptation is required to be performed. This includes
detecting failures of security requirements and possibly
SPRs, probably diagnosis and prognosis of a detected issue,
and also risk assessment when there is even no require-
ment failure or attack. Third, PRs (Planning Requirements)
specify strategies or tactics for decision making in self-
protection. This may include tolerating security breaches
(e.g., intrusion), repairing a problem, recovering from an
attack, preventing an attack (or preventing its progress),
or relaxing/evolving security requirements. The last but
not the least, ERs (Execution Requirements) specify what
should be considered in applying adaptation actions? What
if adaptation actions cannot be applied and something goes
wrong?
Two other significant entities in Figure 2 are sensors
and effectors. The autonomic manager should be aware
of what monitors and effectors are provided by managed
elements, and what are constraints to use them at runtime.
For example, the overload of sensors and conflicts between
effectors should be specified. Self-protection requirements,
particularly, MRs and ERs need to take into account char-
acteristics and limitations of sensors and effectors.
As discussed by Cheng et al. [3], in adaptation require-
ments flexibility and uncertainty need to be considered by
changing the vocabulary we use to express requirements. In
traditional requirements normally “shall” and “must” enforce
a behavior on the system, while in an autonomic system
“ought to”, “might” and “may” are more appropriate to post-
pone the behavior selection to runtime. When the autonomic
manager has more information about the situation, it can
decide what to do based on existing alternatives, provided
at design time or discovered during runtime.
VI. DEFINING SELF-PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS IN
THE CUSTOMER DOMAIN
In this section, we derive several sample self-protecting
requirements from the AMI-SEC document. We investigate
selected requirements in Table I for this purpose. First SPRs
are derived and then they will be refined regarding the
MAPE loop.
A. Sample self-protection scenarios
1) First scenario (Authorization and availability): In
some situations the number of concurrent sessions may
need adjustment to give access to higher priority users
(e.g., maintenance agents). This means that AZR1 may
not fail, but because the lack of resources high priority
users cannot access the system. As noted before, this
could be a DoS attack. In this scenario, the autonomic
manager should handle AZR1 by considering AVR1. The
following self-protection requirement is defined to address
this scenario:
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SPR1: If a user (or subject) cannot access resources
and AZR1 does not fail, the autonomic manager ought to
enforce AVR1 for higher priority users.
2) Second scenario (Authorization and performance):
Assume the specified tasks in the AZR2 requirement in
Table I do not have acceptable performance. This may be
because of different reasons including component failures,
but AZR2 aims to limit the access in order to release
resources for high priority tasks. If autonomic manager
observes that this cannot happen, in other words AZR2
fails, access control policies could be changed temporarily
to tolerate the poor performance situation. Obviously, the
autonomic manager cannot block all possible accesses to
the metering system. For this purpose, a self-protecting
requirement is defined as following :
SPR2: The autonomic manager might modify access control
rules when performance of [specified tasks in AZR2] cannot
be satisfied by AZR2, considering other performance
requirements.
This requirement by itself is not enough to specify
the autonomic manager behavior. As we show later in
Section VI-B, this SPR1 is decomposed into requirements
for the MAPE loop. Again, here we use “might”, because
changing access control rule might not be the most
appropriate option for that situation, perhaps considering
performance requirements.
3) Third scenario (Accountability): For the third
scenario, consider requirements ACR1 and ACR2 in
Table I. In this scenario two threats may exist. First,
something similar to a buffer-overflow attack may occur by
adding a malicious action that deletes the records in case
of an overflow. Note that the action may log an audit trail
transfer or back up, but it actually deletes the trail. In this
case, the autonomic manager should monitor actions taken
because of ACR2 to detect any possible security breach. A
self-protection requirement can be defined for this case:
SPR3: The autonomic manager shall supervise the actions
performed to satisfy ACR2 to prevent the loss of audit trail
data.
In SPR3, we used “shall” to oblige the autonomic man-
ager. Although, this is a strict behavior, preventing malicious
actions on the audit trail can be done in different ways.
Second, the audit trail overflow may happen frequently,
which may cause problems for system availability. The
autonomic manager needs to monitor ACR2 and detect
its frequent failures. Also, ACR1 might not be satisfied
and proper actions may need to be taken accordingly. The
following self-protection requirement is defined for this
purpose:
SPR4: The autonomic manager shall take a proper action
when ACR1 fails possibly because of frequent audit trail
overflows (ACR2 causes actions frequently).
B. Decomposing metering self-protection requirements for
the MAPE loop
The next step is mapping SPRs to the MAPE loop by
defining MRs, ARs, PRs and ERs.
1) First scenario: In this scenario, a monitor requirement
needs to keep track of access failures and the number of
concurrent sessions for different users:
MR1: The autonomic manager shall monitor any access
failure to system and the number of concurrent sessions for
each user using [provided sensors].
Also an analysis requirement is needed for checking
failure or success of AVR1:
AR1: If a user cannot access a resource, while other users
with lower priority are currently accessing that resource,
AVR1 fails.
Another analysis requirement can be defined to figure
out the failure cause. In this case, the planning function can
respond effectively (e.g., providing more resources if DoS
attack is not the reason). A possible planning requirement
would be:
PR1: The autonomic manager ought to manage lower
priority users (or processes) to allow access to the high
priority user based on AVR1.
ER in this scenario is defined as following:
ER1: The autonomic manager ought to satisfy PR1 using
[specific effectors in the metering system] when AVR1 fails.
The effectors are provided by the metering software (i.e.,
managed element). For example, PR1 may be satisfied by
disconnecting at least one of the sessions of the lower
priority users (or processes). Here the effector could be
provided by the energy management console or the meter.
In this case, AZR1 may be violated, because the number
of allowed sessions might not be provided for users with
a lower level of priority. This situation can be handled by
considering priority of these two security requirements.
But what if this scenario happens frequently? The
autonomic manager might change AZR1 to lower the limit
of concurrent sessions for lower priority users. For example
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the following planning requirement might handle this case:
PR2: if AVR1 fails frequently for high priority users, the
system might change the number of concurrent sessions for
lower priority users in AZR1.
But the system needs an analysis requirement to know a
frequent failure:
AR2: if AVR1 fails [a specific number] of times in a
[specific time period] for users with priority more than
[specified level], AVR1 fails frequently.
However, PR2 and AR2 can be defined in another way by
referring to PR1. In this case, if PR1 is applied frequently,
then AZR1 should be changed. This is an example in
which self-protection requirements can refer to each other.
In this situation, ER2 is defined similarly to ER1, based on
specific effectors provided to satisfy PR2.
2) Second scenario: For the planning function, we may
define a planning requirement like this:
PR3: If AZR2 fails, and performance of [specified tasks
in AZR2] is unacceptable, the system ought to block
low-priority users for [a certain amount of time].
Of course we need to monitor AZR2 and detect its
dissatisfaction. MR1 and MR2 define two such monitor
requirements
MR2: The system shall monitor the performance of
[specified tasks in AZR2].
MR3: The system shall monitor accesses and actions from
users and all the processes using [provided sensors].
AR1 is defined for detecting the AZR2 failure:
AR3: If in [a certain period of time] the system cannot
provide the specified level of performance for [specified
tasks in AZR2] due to user access, AZR2 fails.
As noted before, the performance problem may not be-
cause of user access, and the analysis requirement should
figure out whether this is the root cause of the problem. Note
that in this case the security requirement AZR2 addresses
performance directly, but this is not necessarily the case, and
the autonomic manager may consider other requirements of
the managed element as well.
ER3 can be defined as:
ER3: The autonomic manager may apply actions taken by
PR3 and hold the condition unless an emergency happens
(may change priorities).
The emergency may be defined for security or safety-
critical cases. For example, consider when fire is detected
in a house and customer, which might be low priority user,
wants to access the system.
3) Third scenario: For this scenario, a monitor
requirement needs to observe actions taken by ACR2:
MR4: The autonomic manager shall monitor actions that are
taken by ACR2 on the audit trail using [provided sensors].
An analysis requirement can be defined as following to
deal with the first case in the third scenario:
AR4: If the audit trail is flushed by an action specified in
ACR2 without reporting to the assigned utility company,
the action is malicious.
A response can be defined by a planning requirement as:
PR4: If a malicious action flushes the audit trail, the action
must be blocked (or removed).
ER4 is similar to ER3 with different effectors.
For the second case of the third scenario, in which
ACR2 causes performing actions frequently, this analysis
requirement can be defined:
AR5: If ACR2 causes performing actions on audit trail
[a specific number] of times in a [specific time period],
actions could be suspicious or ACR1 cannot be satisfied.
The autonomic manager may eventually notify the
customer and utility company that ACR1 cannot be satisfied
and the storage capacity should be increased or the period
of data transmission or backup should be decreased. A
planning requirement may change ACR1 to increase the
audit record storage capacity.
PR5: If the audit trail exceeds from its limit frequently
(ACR2 is fired frequently), the system ought to increase the
record storage capacity.
ER5 is set to assure PR5 is satisfied, but in reality there
may be no additional resources to added automatically by
system. In this case ER5 notifies the customer and the utility
company lack of enough storage capacity.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper explored smart metering as an application do-
main for autonomic self-protection. Cyber-physical security
issues, and protecting energy and its related information
in a complex smart metering system may not be easy
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to address at design time. By considering the customer
domain in AMI, we investigated a few possible security
scenarios that need runtime management. We defined the
corresponding self-protection requirement for each scenario.
These requirements were elaborated later for the autonomic
reference architecture [6] and especially the MAPE loop.
This mapping improves requirements traceability, which in
turn may be useful for maintainability and verification. A
notable point is that these requirements can refer to each
other. For example, a planning or execution requirement can
be addressed by monitoring requirements to deal with their
failures.
Autonomic/adaptation requirements have some differ-
ences from traditional requirements. Flexibility, variability
and uncertainty should be reflected in autonomic require-
ments, yet there is no language for expressing these require-
ments. In this paper, based on guidelines from Cheng et
al. [3], we expressed self-protection requirements and their
refinements in the MAPE loop. This approach can reflect
autonomic aspects better than traditional requirements, al-
though verification and assurance would be more difficult
(which is expected for an autonomic system).
To extend this work on self-protection requirements, sev-
eral future directions can be taken. Self-protection require-
ments can be defined based on the hierarchy of security
goals. In this way, the metering system goal model is
extended with self-protection goals to monitor and analyze
satisfaction state of security goals. Another point is that self-
protection requirements may be used only for developing
the autonomic manager. But if the autonomic manager
includes AMI security requirements as runtime objects, self-
protection requirements can be represented at runtime as
well. These requirements could be similar to self-protection
requirements in this paper or live adaptation goals.
The scenarios we discussed in this paper are reactive,
since they happen when requirements fail. But, a self-
protecting system could be proactive to change security
controls even when no security requirements have failed.
For instance, the system can be risk-adaptive to increase
the protection level in case risk increases. When the threat
level in a region increases or valuable assets are added
to customer premises, the system may need to change the
security control. We noted that these cases can be addressed
using runtime models, although we did not cover them in
this paper.
In this paper, we did not discuss security issues of the
autonomic manger. Self-protection requirements may be
defined to protect an autonomic manager and its MAPE
functions and policies as critical assets. We also did not
address coordination between self-protection and other au-
tonomic properties. This aspect is also important in engineer-
ing an autonomic manager in practice. Using requirements
and models at runtime could facilitate handling the multi-
objective nature of autonomic management.
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